National health program legislation has been becalmed in the Congress for almost 80 years. Despite periodic cries of "crisis," legislation never emerges from committee. Periodically, campaigns have been mounted without success. Tactical efforts to circumvent direct action by legislating bits and pieces of related programs, Medicare and Medicaid, health maintenance organization support, and pre-budgeting, have complicated operation of the medical care system and stimulated intractable cost inflation.
INTRODUCTION
In the long debate over the past 80 years on the need for a national health program, three issues have emerged as crucial elements for consideration. One is how to achieve equity for the population; that is, reasonably equal access to modern medical care. The second, much more prominent today, is how to achieve this goal at a cost to individuals and society that is acceptable and fair. Finally, the matter of the quality of the medical services provided has, in recent years, acquired importance, especially in regard to the issue of medical malpractice, its costs, and its effect on medical practice.
These problems did not just come to public attention, nor are they restricted to the United States. Most industrialized countries have had to deal with the issues and attempted to control cost and improve access to medical care with a national health insurance scheme. Great Britain alone of the Western European nations began with a tax-supported system of guaranteed services rather than insurance. In this century, the United States alone has failed to resolve the controversy as to whether or not the federal government should undertake a national health program. Not only that, but, during these years, the public has been exposed to contradictory arguments over how such a system is to be funded and administered, if it were to come into being.
Within the past few decades, however, public argument over the topic has become more sharply focused, with the financial aspects at the forefront of the discussion. Uncontrollable inflation of costs, a widening gap between services available to those insured and those uninsured against the costs of medical care, along with an increase in the number of individuals and families without health insurance have served to center the debate on insurance coverage and cost-control measures. There is a growing consensus that the fiscal situation demands that the United States legislate a national health care plan. While opinions differ as to how this aim is to be accomplished, all the participants agree that the appropriate venue for resolution is in the United States Congress.
It is certainly true that if the nation is to be served, it must be with national legislation. But it is not so clear that the only, or appropriate approach is through the Congress directly. For the first 150 years of American history, the traditional American response to community welfare and health needs was for the states to establish the pattern and the federal government to follow. Poverty and the lack of access to medical care were not considered national issues. The Constitution supported this view. In the federalist system of shared responsibilities, the guiding principle is the Tenth Amendment, that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Health matters are not delegated to the federal government in the Constitution. During this period, local and state governments, close to the site of established needs and difficulties, designed the programs and assumed legislative priority.
In the nineteenth century, after the Civil War clarified the idea of national citizenship, and advances in transportation and communication united the states more firmly into a nation, state initiatives began to influence national legislation. States provided the models for the pertinent sections of the 1935 Social Security Act, the 1965 Medicaid program, the 1972 Supplemental Security Income Program, and scores of early public health measures [1] . It was in Wisconsin and Michigan, in Illinois and Massachusetts that measures were first adopted for support of poor women and children, for the elderly and the blind, decades before the Social Security Act. Pensions and unemployment compensation were state initiatives long before they became federal laws. Hard rock miners compelled western states to pass occupational health and safety ordinances 50 years before the federal government passed such laws [2] . The Sheppard-Towner child health legislation in 1921 was built on the model of earlier Connecticut law. The American Public Health Association lists dozens of "firsts," in which states legislated public health matters long before the federal government was involved, laws which became the pattern for federal laws or regulations [3] .
Today, as resentment grows over the sluggish responsiveness and impersonality of a distant bureaucracy, it is increasingly argued that social concerns should be responded to where the needs are felt first and most strongly. And, of course, it may be more prudent to try out new approaches to health care delivery in a few states in advance of attempting a national program. It is more reasonable to introduce an experimental program for a few million people, and find out the flaws, than to try it immediately on 250 million. "Common sense suggests trying the program on a small scale to gain advance knowledge about effects on incentives" [4] . In some instances, it may even be easier and more manageable for states to respond to their more circumscribed issues.
Justice Brandeis, in a famous dissent, noted that " [i] and drive toward social welfare prescriptions was cut short by America's involvement in the first World War [9] .
After the war, the American roller coaster ride of enormous wealth in the 1920s dampened enthusiasm for welfare legislation. Social reform and social welfare goals did not altogether disappear, however, and the Depression in the 1930s aroused renewed interest and fervor. In the background, the liberal agenda had continued in health-related studies and women's interest-group agitation. In 1922, a powerful coalition of women social reformers had succeeded in obtaining a federal law to stimulate state programs for social and medical assistance to pregnant women and infants [10] .
The Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, in 1932, focused attention on the fact that, in addition to economic barriers, there were inadequacies, deficiencies, and inequities in the medical care system that required attention and repair [11] .
By this time, a variety of other efforts had been undertaken in the hope of bringing the loosely organized, private and entrepreneurial American medical care system into the public domain. A number of states had made unsuccessful efforts to legislate universal (statewide) comprehensive health insurance programs [12] . State legislators were cautious of the tax implications and were wary of writing blank checks for the medical profession. It should be kept in mind that, before 1935, there was no strong tradition of federal grant programs to support state initiatives.
Some physicians, cooperatives, and community groups did begin to organize group practices for improvement of access to modern medical care and to spread the risks of unanticipated expenditures for that care. As the Depression's effect lengthened, the federal government was drawn into provision of payment for medical care for the indigent [13] . The rural population, less well supplied with medical services to start with, sought and obtained even more public support, in the form of model demonstrations of publicly supported, organized, medical care schemes [14] .
Trade unions, which in the early days had opposed national health legislation as preemptive of union responsibilities and interference into the labor/employer negotiating process, began to champion national health insurance. The legislative drive for the Social Security Act both supported and undermined the efforts to obtain a national health program. President Roosevelt was persuaded by his congressional advisors and by medical professionals close to him that antagonizing American doctors by placing a national health program within the orbit of the Social Security Bill would doom the possibility of passage. So it was left out, with the promise that separate legislation would follow [15] . The Medicare and Medicaid, along with the lavish federal support for medical schools, produced not unexpected side effects. The inflation of medical care costs had profound influence on the Congress because of the tax implications. Between 1960 and 1970, not only did the total expenditure for medical care skyrocket, but federal contributions to those expenditures exploded [16] . Congress now had to explore control measures. Since 1970, the preoccupation has been cost control, not access or equity.
The efforts at cost control: planning, regulatory measures, payment ceilings, promotion of prepaid group practice, professional reviews, diagnostic-related groups, have not had any success. Inflation has far outstripped federal capability to control expenditures. The combination of lack of access to medical care for millions of Americans, with an unmanageable inflation of costs, fuels a drive toward a national health program.
Blendon and Taylor conclude that "In the public's mind, it is clear that America has now exhausted all the other possibilities" [17] . Industry, the major purchaser of health insurance, finds itself at a marketing disadvantage because of the high, rising, and uncontrollable costs of health insurance premiums. Physicians, through their national organization and in ad hoc clusters as well, seem to have agreed that it is time for a national program [18] .
THE ISSUES
The pressures on Congress, professional groups such as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Hospital Association, and the health care insurance companies are directed toward developing a legislative package that will ameliorate the suffering of the underserved, provide coverage for the uninsured, control costs, and satisfy doctors and hospitals without huge tax increases or intolerable additional wage assessments.
Physicians are sullen and discontented under the burden of regulations and constraints that seriously impede their flexibility and ability to utilize professional judgment freely. Patients are angry with inflated costs, rising insurance premiums, and various impediments and obstacles to maintaining a comfortable, friendly relationship with doctors. Other patients are unable to obtain needed medical services to the extent required, or at all. Critics and reformers attack the medical profession as greedy, uncaring, and even incompetent. Malpractice accusations proliferate, and costs and judgments soar. 447 The political pot keeps boiling as bill after bill is introduced in the Congress to correct the defects and resolve the issues. Solutions flow from a variety of sourcespolitical, professional, academic, and social reform-each with little or no input from the other. As in ethnic conflicts in some geographic areas of the world, patients and doctors have been antagonists rather than allies in an effort to correct and redeem the values both seek.
In the past, physicians have displayed little leadership in positive proposals, although recently they have been more forthcoming. Medical schools do not do much to prepare their graduates for the social concerns associated with medical practice. A distinguished British physician once compared this circumstance to the Church preparing missionaries for their role in the field, by instructing them on every aspect of the behavior of their prospective constituencies except their occasional urge to eat missionaries.
Lee Goldman, Harvard cardiologist, notes that efforts to stimulate physicians into more appropriate and economical use of laboratory tests had no lasting effect. He commented that ". . . we as a profession should complain less about the difficulty of altering patients' behavior and learn more about how to change our own. . ." [19] .
Patients too are reluctant to change old ways in seeking or paying for medical care. Although prepaid group practice offers significant advantages in access, cost, and quality, after 50 years of experience, fewer than 25 percent of Americans buy into group practices. There is abundant evidence of this kind of conservatism, a cautious resistance to change, in historic failures to adopt or to reject healing procedures. Ackerknecht noted that, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, amputations in the field without anesthesia were still the rule, though ether had been effectively utilized for that purpose by Long in 1842 and Morton in 1846. On the other hand, the negative effect of bleeding as a therapeutic measure was described in 1830, but the practice itself continued well into the twentieth century [20] .
The use of citrus as a preventive against scurvy on long sea voyages was established experimentally by Captain James Lancaster of the British Navy in 1601; by Captain James Lind, also of the British Navy, in 1747, but was not adopted into general practice in the British Navy until 1795, or into the merchant navy until 1865 [21] .
On the other side, in amusing counterpoint, it should be noted that "QWERTY," the arrangement of the letters on the standard typewriter (and computer) keyboard was developed in 1873, to slow typists down and so keep the keys from tangling! As the machines improved and typists began to use two hands, this antiquated "QWERTY" keyboard became an obstacle: harder to learn and harder to use. In 1932, August Dvorak developed a keyboard adjusted to the new situation, yet it is almost impossible to find a typewriter or computer with such an efficient keyboard in the shops today [22] .
Perhaps we cannot expect ideas for human betterment to be translated into acceptance at the same speed with which dress fashions and popular music race around the world. The development of a national medical care program must take into account the cautious conservatism of physicians and public resistance to change. The The lack of consideration for the interrelated effects of apparently independent legislative action is notable in the recent effort at cost control. This isolated legislative approach mandated hospital pre-budgeting and has had the effect of worsening patient care, by stimulating hasty discharge of very sick patients [24] .
The American Medical Association proposed, first, simply extending Medicaid but has moved on to adding legislation for broader work-related health insurance, for improving access. Still, the AMA is cautiously more voluntary than compulsory insurance-related and does not deal with cost or quality control in their recommendations [25] .
The Pepper Commission, a congressionally organized group, addresses itself entirely to improving the insurance aspect and to assuring that most Americans will be covered by work-related, or expanded Medicare and Medicaid insurance. While its proposal contains references to quality and cost control, the specifics are lacking, and the language is not encouraging: "recommends private and public initiative" [26] .
Alan Enthoven hopes to improve access, quality, and cost control by augmenting work-related insurance and investing in wide-scale group practice. This approach minimizes the possibility of cost control and does nothing to guarantee access for the marginally poor and uninsured [27] .
It is becoming fashionable to propose an American version of the Canadian health care system. The best known of such proposals is that of the Physicians for a National Health Program, who propose a "single, comprehensive public insurance program," in which the present sources of payment would flow into a single public fund; put the doctors and hospitals on an annual budget for operations; and allow physicians to select payment either on fee-for-service, based on a mandatory national fee schedule, or by capitation and salaries [28] .
It ought to be pointed out that the Canadian system didn't spring fully armed from the brain of the Canadian Parliament. There was a ten-year lag between the establishment of the first universal health program in the province of Saskatchewan, and the legislation of a country-wide health program by the Canadian Parliament.
There is a legitimate question as to the applicability of an unmodified Canadian plan. United States citizens do not behave like Canadians in a number of ways, most notably in their political acceptance of government's role in social action and its intervention in family matters. Will Americans accept the queuing and delays in elective surgery characteristic of the Canadian medical services? True, for the poor and uninsured in the U.S.A., that is routine now. But what of the other 85 percent of the population? The Canadian city of Windsor, Ontario, across the river from Detroit, Michigan, had a comprehensive health insurance plan in operation from the early 1930s. The two cities are similar in many ways-auto manufacturing, the auto workers' unions negotiating health benefits-but the Detroit auto workers never adopted the comprehensive health insurance program of the Windsor auto workers.
What we might do, if we are so inclined, after examining the bugs and glitches in the Canadian system, is to use their model as a basis for an American model, improve on it, and avoid their mistakes! Others look abroad for a pattern of improvement, to Britain, the Netherlands, or 449 Germany [29] . While adoption of a modified Canadian model is possible, it is far less likely that the conservative streak in American politics, usually coupled with a kind of nativism, would allow easy and swift adoption of a foreign medical care program.
PLANNING FOR A NATIONAL PROGRAM BY WAY OF THE STATES
Despite the vigorous recommendations and demands for change, it is doubtful that federal legislation is imminent. We've spent nearly a century in a fruitless effort to legislate a national health program for the United States. We've tried a frontal assault in Washington almost annually since 1939. We've tried flanking attacks, resulting in dozens of bits and pieces of legislation and regulation, in the hope that the pieces would eventually be joined in an edifice. Instead, the effect seems to have been to confound the issues and set us back in costs, increase inflation, and diminish access. Since the subject of national health insurance has been broached, it has been subjected to limitless discussion, debate, and defiance, but not to legislative action. I am reminded of the acid comments of a British professor of social medicine, that "both parties practice a form of political contraception, in which no matter how suggestive the preliminary movements, there are no embarrassing legislative consequences."
In short, none of the proposals seems to be any closer to resolution in the Congress than they have been for years. [30] . The National Governors' Conference has had this subject on the agenda in 1990 and 1991.
In Massachusetts, the legislature passed a compulsory insurance law in 1989, but has as yet been unable to fund it. Hawaii passed a compulsory insurance law in 1974, but only after long judicial delays was the state able to put the law into effect. It provides for three channels of insurance, not a single-payer system, but has been successful in reducing costs, to some extent. Oregon has been notable in the public exercise of debate on a rationing system for controlling the costs of medical care, but only for the poor at first [31] .
Given 
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This theoretical plan is not to suggest that the appropriate response to the need for a national health policy requires a painfully slow state-by-state progression toward that goal. "State initiative" is not intended to create a national medical care program piece by piece. Such an effort would be self-defeating, since it would only add further fragmentation, discordance, and inequities to an already unsatisfactory national picture. The federal role must be collaborative, utilizing state initiatives for initial developments of an anticipated equitable national system of medical care delivery. Not only should the projected state programs be consistent with national goals, but the federal government must be a secure partner in the approach and the eventual operations.
To encourage state initiative in developing a comprehensive, statewide, universal medical care program, the federal government should make incentive grants available to states that propose to design such programs. American pluralism suggests that more than one state initiative should be encouraged. When the Congress turns to designing a national program, it will have the benefit of the various state experiences. Schultze has written of "market analogues"-public funding of competing public programs, in order to allow selection of the one that is most efficient, economical, and satisfactory-multiple state experimentation would permit such encouragement [32] .
Insofar as the state initiative is to be generated on behalf of the eventual national solution, the federal government in its "specifications" should require the demonstration projects to meet basic conditions that will reinforce the national requirements: Each subsidized state initiative ought to guarantee universal coverage, comprehensive benefits, a single public payer, global budgeting, and quality assurance.
The proposal does take into account the various necessary conditions for an improved medical care service. It offers a guarantee of access, in that the entire population is included; it has more regulatory oversight for cost savings; and it presents an opportunity for quality control via the reporting to a central payer. It attacks, but does not interfere too heavily with, the status quo and therefore does not antagonize current professional beneficiaries. From cost estimates of comprehensive services of this kind, and reduced costs of improved administration, an incentive grant from the federal government would be in the neighborhood of $200 million for each million people to be served.
The states would be encouraged to experiment with forms of organization, reimbursement, and administration. But the basic conditions would involve equal access for all citizens to comprehensive services and universal eligibility. Local communities would be expected to participate in policy planning, operational controls, and funding. States would also be encouraged to experiment with program design, particularly in administrative decision making-how patients and physicians operate as a "team," allocation of local resources (such as hospital beds), and the need to take into account small-area variations in the utilization of procedures. The conjoint leadership of health professionals with consumers should be cultivated. An excellent existing model of a well-functioning "team" relationship of this kind exists in the quality assurance department in operation at Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, the nation's largest consumer-governed health care organization and third largest prepaid group medical practice [33] . One of the keys to their success is that health professionals, rather than insurance billing departments, lead the efforts to improve the quality of care [34] .
Not the least of the benefits achieved by the process could be a new relationship of 451 the medical care system to patients, to wipe out the hard economic facade that has been medicine's countenance for many years now. This change would mean not only provision of more sympathetic and personal care, but more evidence of concern by professional caregivers, in the doctors' offices and in the hospitals for solicitous, prompt, and competent medical services and elimination of the carelessness associated with poor or inept diagnosis and treatment, thoughtlessness, and neglect. In short, the growing recognition of the need for a national health plan compels us to seek the surest and most effective route to that end. Eighty years of unsuccessful maneuvering at the congressional level hardly reassures us that the congressional route is the way to go. The traditional pathway to important national social legislation is through the states. At least part of the delay in legislating a national health program in the United States may be attributed to the lack of good state models for the nation to emulate. The route to a national health program may well wind through the states.
The states themselves are beginning to look about for a resolution in those terms. A shared program of federal, state, and local public financing, as suggested here, in an appropriate organizational design appears promising. With federal stimulus in the form of financial underpinning, selected states should be encouraged to undertake experiments in fashioning individual plans. The correction of flaws and deficiencies discovered in the operation of these state plans would provide the structural basis for an eventual federal program.
There may be dissent from those who seek immediate federal action, and who argue that the "principle" of national purpose demands national action. Wilbur Cohen, onetime Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, had an amusing and insightful response to arguments of procedure "on principle." He would say, "Sometimes we have to give up our principles and do what's right."
